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Abstract
In large Chapter 11 cases, the prototypical creditor is no longer a small player
holding a claim much like everyone else’s, but rather a distressed debt profes‐
sional advancing her own agenda. Secured creditors are more pervasive and
enjoy much more control than they had even a decade ago. Moreover, financial
innovation has dramatically increased the complexity of each investor’s posi‐
tion. As a result of these and other changes, the legal system faces today a chal‐
lenge that is much like assembling a city block that has been broken up into
many parcels. There exists an anti‐commons problem, a world in which own‐
ership interests are fragmented and conflicting. This is quite at odds with the
standard account of Chapter 11—that it solves a tragedy of the commons, the
collective action problem that exists when general creditors share numerous
dispersed, but otherwise similar, interests. This paper draws on the lessons of
cooperative game theory to show how in combination these recent changes are
toxic. They undermine the coalition formation process that is a foundational
assumption of Chapter 11.

Chapter 11 is now the last firewall protecting many of the country’s
largest corporations. It may hold. Over the last decade and especially
during the dot.com meltdown, Chapter 11 has been singularly success‐
ful. Long‐gone is the time when the managers of Eastern Airlines could
allow it to wither away in bankruptcy with the creditors standing help‐
lessly by.1 A new breed of bankruptcy judges, lawyers, and turnaround
specialists have come on the scene. They do not get caught up in emo‐
tion. They can cast a cold eye, harness markets, and make tough deci‐
sions. Billion‐dollar corporations (United, Kmart, Budget Rent‐A‐Car)
overcame financial distress in Chapter 11 and continued to operate.2
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Seth Lubove, A Bankrupt’s Best Friend, FORBES, Apr. 1, 1991, at 99.

For a discussion of United’s Chapter 11, see David Armstrong, United
Plan Approved: Reorganization will Let Airline Emerge from Bankruptcy, THE SAN
2
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Even in such fraud‐ridden cases as Enron, assets were sensibly rede‐
ployed, general creditors received substantial recoveries, and wrong‐
doers and their fellow travelers were held to account.3
There is, however, considerable reason to doubt that reorganization
law is up to the challenge it is about to face, at least in the largest cases.4
The successes of recent years do not readily translate to the current eco‐
nomic environment. The players today are different from those in past

FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan, 21, 2006, at C1. For Kmart’s, see Michelle M. Harn‐
er, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of Activist Distressed
Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 725–27 (2008). Budget used Chapter 11
to effect a sale. See Terry Brennan, Judge OKs Budget Sale to Cendant, DAILY
DEAL, November 9, 2002.
See Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.: Recovery Rate Hits 50 Percent as Enron
Creditors Receive More Than $6 Billion in Special Distributions, INVESTMENT BUSI‐
NESS WEEKLY, June 16, 2008, at 164 (“Today’s distribution pushes the total
amount returned to creditors past $20 billion, almost triple the amount origi‐
nally anticipated. With this distribution, Enron creditors now are receiving 50.3
cents on the dollar and Enron North America Corp. . . . creditors are receiving
50 cents on the dollar, both excluding gains, interest and dividends.”). Financial
institutions that participated in the off‐balance sheet vehicles that masked En‐
ron’s financial condition were forced to make substantial settlements. See, e.g.,
id. (reporting $1.866 billion settlement by Citibank to resolve the claims of En‐
ron’s general creditors against it). For the fate of Enron’s executives, see Kristen
Hays, Kenneth Rice is the Final Figure to be Punished After Pleading Guilty to Crimes
in the Scandal: A Sordid Chapter on Enron Ending, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 18,
2007, at A1 (reporting that eight Enron former executives are serving prison
terms of up to twenty‐four years).
3

In this paper, our focus is on the largest cases, those involving hundreds
of millions or billions of dollars. The dynamic of small cases is utterly different
and one cannot extrapolate from one to the other. See Douglas G. Baird, Arturo
Bris & Ning Zhu, The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical
Study (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 05‐29; AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings
Paper; ECGI – Finance, Working Paper No. 107/2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=866865 (showing that capital structures of small and
large cases are dramatically different).
4
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downturns.5 For a long time, the capital structure of a firm in reorgani‐
zation consisted of a senior bank with a security interest in all the firm’s
assets and a group of dispersed, but homogenous, unsecured creditors
that an active creditors’ committee could represent.6 The bank, the
committee, and the debtor’s managers bargained with each other
against a backdrop of well‐developed norms.
Today we no longer have a single bank and dispersed general cred‐
itors. Dozens of constantly changing stakeholders occupy every tranche,
each pursuing its own agenda.7 Some seek long‐term control of the
business, while others are passive, short‐term investors. Others may
Some of these changes have been underway for a time, but remained
largely invisible during a period of enormous liquidity. In the early part of this
decade, selling even the largest businesses on the market was usually an op‐
tion. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56
STAN. L. REV. 673, 679 (2003) (reporting that apart from the instances in which
Chapter 11 was used to implement a deal arranged outside of bankruptcy,
there were 67 large reorganization cases in 2002 and 52 were sales of one kind
or another).
5

See Marshall S. Huebner & Benjamin A. Tisdell, As the Wheel Turns: New
Dynamics in the Coming Restructuring Cycle, in THE AMERICAS RESTRUCTURING
AND INSOLVENCY GUIDE 2008/2009 77, 78 (2008) (“Twenty‐five years ago . . .
[t]he major creditor participants in corporate reorganisations were usually large
commercial banks and other institutional creditors (e.g., insurance companies),
indenture trustees representing bondholders and the debtors’ vendors.”)
6

See generally Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An
Empirical Study of Investors’ Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 93 (2008)
(“Distressed debt investors with different investment strategies but the same
investment target may lead to potential conflicts among creditors.”); Stephen J.
Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405,
407 (2007) (“The operation of chapter 11 is premised on a perception of owner‐
ship that may no longer exist or is at the very least threatened by the expansion
of credit derivatives.”); Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 in Transition – From Boom to
Bust and into the Future, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 390 (2007) (“Distressed debt
traders have different motivations and objectives than the old line relationship
banks and trade creditors. . . . The explosion of distressed debt trading marked
the end of the relationships that had been a major support structure of the reor‐
ganization paradigm of 1978.”).
7
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hold a basket of both long and short positions in multiple tranches and
complicated hedges involving other businesses. Their concerns—such as
whether a particular action will be a “credit event” in a credit default
swap—often have nothing to do with preserving the business or maxi‐
mizing the value of its assets. Indeed, failure of the business can mean
large returns to some creditors.8 The recent credit contraction has meant
that the sale of the company sometimes must be done too quickly and
sometimes cannot be done at all. In short, the new world of corporate
reorganizations has more heterogeneous creditors whose rights against
the business are deeply fragmented.
In the past, the bargains that parties reached among themselves fol‐
lowed a few familiar patterns. While there were many possible deals,
the players naturally gravitated towards only a few.9 In the new envi‐
ronment, with different players holding different stakes, the old pat‐
terns no longer apply and new ones have yet to take shape. There are no
longer organized groups (like agented lenders or even creditors’ com‐
mittees), but instead investors have “one‐off” relationships with the
debtor entity (for example, counterparties with individual repos or
swaps). The types of institutions vary—from banks and broker‐dealers
to hedge funds and private equity firms. The current environment is one
in which there are no natural leaders (or followers) among the creditors
to perform the shuttle diplomacy required to build a consensus. With‐
out familiar benchmarks, there is no shared understanding of what form
a plan should take. Coalition formation is harder.10 Worse yet, in some

Karl Denninger, GM: Bankrupt, UNLESS...., MARKET TICKER, April 1, 2009
(speculating that GM bondholders are refusing to renegotiate because their
bonds are backed by AIG credit default swaps that will pay in full if GM files
for bankruptcy).
8

To cast things in the language of game theory, there were many possible
equilibrium agreements, but comparatively few were focal points. For the clas‐
sic discussion of focal points, see THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CON‐
FLICT 57–58 (1960).
9

In the recent Adelphia reorganization, for example, infighting among at
least 12 unofficial groups of creditors resulted in seven proposed reorganiza‐
tion plans, and professional fees and expenses initially sought by these twelve
10
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cases there may be no stable equilibrium at all. To use the language of
cooperative game theory, the core may be empty.11
groups alone totaled over $100 million. See Huebner & Tisdell, supra note 6, at
80.
An “empty core” exists when three or more parties cannot reach a stable
agreement with each other because some other agreement always exists that
some parties prefer. In other words, one or more people will always defect
from any tentative agreement that might be made and hence none ever is. Low
transaction costs create a frictionless environment in which agreements cannot
stick. For an accessible introduction to the problem of the empty core, see Les‐
ter G. Telser, The Usefulness of Core Theory in Economics, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 151
(1994). The problem of the empty core may require some qualification of the
Coase theorem, as it is premised on the idea that parties can reach agreement
with one another if transaction costs are low enough and information is perfect.
See Varouj A. Aivazian & Jeffrey L. Callen, The Coase Theorem and the Empty
Core, 24 J.L. & ECON 175 (1981); Varouj A. Aivazian & Jeffrey L. Callen, The Core,
Transaction Costs, and the Coase Theorem, 14 CONST. POL. ECON. 287 (2003) (ex‐
panding upon the argument that the Coase theorem may break down when
faced with an empty core). But see R.H. Coase, The Coase Theorem and the Empty
Core: A Comment, 24 J. L. & ECON. 183 (1981) (arguing that the empty core and
the Coase Theorem can be reconciled through penalty clauses and time con‐
straints).
11

The empty core has been applied to antitrust and other areas of the law.
See, e.g., George Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New
Look at the Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J.L. & ECON. 201 (1982) (applying the empty
core to the Addyston Pipe antitrust case); Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Financial
Performance of the Airline Industry Post‐Deregulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 421, 482–84
(2008) (summarizing the empty core as it applies to the airline industry and
deregulation); Keith N. Hylton, Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 471,
502–05 (1993) (applying the empty core to labor law and unions); John Shepard
Wiley Jr., Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 556 (1987) (explaining the
empty core’s application to antitrust law but arguing that judges should ignore
its implications); Henry E. Smith, Structured Settlements as Structures of Rights,
88 VA. L. REV. 1953, 1969‐70 (2002) (applying the empty core problem to struc‐
tured settlements).
Some discussions of bankruptcy have mentioned the problem of the emp‐
ty core in passing. See Daniel J. Bussel, Coalition‐Building Through Bankruptcy
Creditorsʹ Committees, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1547, 1605 n.219 (1996) (noting that coa‐

5
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In this paper, we review the changes in finance over the last decade
and show how each is at odds with basic assumptions of Chapter 11.
Our conclusion can be stated simply. The challenge the legal system fac‐
es is much like assembling a city block that has been broken up into
many parcels. In this scenario, we face an anti‐commons problem, a
world in which ownership interests are fragmented and conflicting.12
This is quite at odds with the standard account of corporate reorganiza‐
tions—that it solves a tragedy of the commons, the collective action
problem that exists when general creditors share numerous dispersed,
but otherwise similar, interests.13 Bankruptcy has become anti‐
bankruptcy.

litions formed in bankruptcy can experience problems similar to the empty core
problem); Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an
Analysis of Opt‐out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85, 122–23
(1997) (comparing collective action problems in class actions to those in bank‐
ruptcy and applying core theory to the problem); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Mis‐
guided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1239 n.75 (1994) (warning
that participants in bankruptcy cases may not be in the best position to deter‐
mine how assets are divided due to empty core problem); Lewis A. Korn‐
hauser, Fair Division of Settlements: A Comment on Silver and Baker, 84 VA. L. REV.
1561, 1575 (1998) (focusing on empty core in the context of settlement and
bankruptcy’s pro rata sharing rule). None of these, however, has connected the
problem to particular provisions of the Code, to the way in which bankruptcy
judges can prevent an empty core, or the way changes in finance have greatly
magnified the problem.
For a discussion of the anti‐commons problem, see Michael Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111
HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). See also Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons,
Semicommons (Univ. of Chicago John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
457; Public Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 261, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1348267; MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY
(2008). 40
12

See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10‐
11 (1986) (noting that the role of bankruptcy to solve a common pool problem is
“largely unquestioned”).
13
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Part I examines how the prototypical general creditor has changed.
It is no longer a small player holding a claim much like everyone else’s.
Moreover, this group changes constantly throughout the course of the
case. Part II examines the changed nature of the secured creditor and
especially the way in which it now enjoys much more control than it
had even a decade ago. In Part III, we focus on financial innovation and
the way that derivatives and the ability to hedge alter the dynamics of
Chapter 11. Part IV draws on the lessons of cooperative game theory to
show how in combination these changes are toxic. They undermine the
coalition formation process that is central to Chapter 11.
I. The Changing Face of Unsecured Debt
A. The Bargaining Dynamic in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy law developed in a world of limited financial instru‐
ments. Secured debt (generally held by banks), bondholders, trade cred‐
itors, and publicly traded stock largely exhausted the types of invest‐
ments that comprised the capital structure of large businesses.14 The ac‐
tion lay at the level of the general creditors. The bankruptcy was for the
benefit of the general creditors. Hence, the drafters of the Bankruptcy
Code provided that administrative expenses are paid after the secured
creditors, but before the general creditors.15

Tort claimants are comparatively rare. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Law‐
rence Westbrook, Contracting out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1227–30 (2005) (excluding mass product liability cases, tort
claims are present in as few as one percent of bankruptcy cases). Other types of
claimants (most notably tax claimants) loom large in smaller cases, but this pa‐
per focuses exclusively on the largest cases. While small Chapter 11s make up
the vast majority in number, the total assets are overwhelmingly concentrated
in a small handful of large cases. For a discussion of the empirical differences
and the resulting radically different dynamics between the large and small cas‐
es, see Baird, Bris & Zhu, supra note 4.
14

See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006) (determining secured status); § 507 (giving
administrative expenses priority over most unsecured claims).
15

7
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The creditors of the typical financially distressed business, whether
bondholder or supplier, enjoyed at bottom the same legal right: the abil‐
ity to sue and reduce their claim to judgment. If each were left to her
own devices, they might tear the business apart. The Bankruptcy Code
worked its magic by forcing the group to work together as one. The
Code turned every variety of right against the debtor into a “claim.”16 A
loan at ten percent due in five years was treated the same as a loan at
five percent due in ten years.17 Someone who had a breach of contract
action had a claim for the damages she would have received under
nonbankruptcy law.
Because they held the same kind of legal right subject to the same
treatment, all had the same incentive to maximize the value of the es‐
tate. Every claim entitled the stakeholder to exactly the same thing—a
pro rata share of the bankruptcy estate.18 A small committee of the larg‐
est creditors could thus look after everyone’s interest.19 The general
creditors as a group bore the expenses of the committee.20 Dispersed
general creditors with small claims were spared the expense of vindicat‐
ing their rights on their own. Because everyone had the same legal
rights and received identical pro rata treatment, we could safely allow
the decisions of the group as a whole to bind the dissenters.21 There was

See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2006) (defining “claim” for purposes of the Bank‐
ruptcy Code as generally any “right to payment”).
16

17

See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (2006) (disallowing claims for unmatured inter‐

est).
See 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2006) (providing for pro rata distributions in
Chapter 7 liquidations). Chapter 11 accomplishes this through requirements
placed on the plan of reorganization. See infra note 20.
18

19

See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (2006).

See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(F) (2006) (including as administrative expenses
of the estate the expenses incurred by members of the creditors’ committee).
20

Only substantially similar claims can be placed in the same class for
purposes of voting on the plan, everyone in a class must be treated identically,
and the plan cannot provide different treatment to classes at the same priority
level. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2006) (claims in the same class must be “substan‐
tially similar”); § 1123(a)(4) (plan must provide for the same treatment for each
21
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no need to fear a tyranny of the majority. The plan had to treat those
similarly situated in the same way.22
The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code assumed that the unsecured
creditors had two hurdles to overcome. One was that they were dis‐
persed. Whereas the secured debt was primarily concentrated in the
hands of a single institution, various parties held unsecured debt. The
problem was one of collective action.23 As a group, the unsecured credi‐
tors would have been better off by taking concerted action, but no one
creditor was willing to take the laboring oar. The costs of participation
fell on those who participated, but the benefits were distributed to all
creditors. While for creditors as a group the best course of action was to
participate in the reorganization discussions, for each individual credi‐
tor the rational thing to do was stay passive. The nonbankruptcy rights
were insufficiently tailored to allow them to act in a way that was mu‐
tually beneficial. Just as the agency issuing fishing licenses or regulating
drilling in an oil field attempts to maximize value, those charged with
overseeing the reorganization took steps to preserve the value of the es‐
tate on behalf of general creditors, who were presumptively similarly
situated and entitled to equal treatment.
In addition to the incentive towards passivity, unsecured creditors
also lacked the information necessary to participate in the reorganiza‐
tion. A central issue was valuation—the amount the company would be
worth if liquidated, and the amount if kept together. While creditors
might have been able to piece together information on liquidation val‐
claim of a particular class); § 1129(b) (unless a class consents, it cannot be un‐
fairly discriminated against). For a discussion of classification and related is‐
sues, see In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 634, 644 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (“Claims
may be classified together only if they are ‘substantially similar’ to one an‐
other” and “substantially similar claims may not be classified separately when
it is done for an illegitimate reason.”).
There are a few exceptions, of course. Some claims (such as those of the
tax collector, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2006), and those of workers for unpaid wag‐
es, § 507(a)(4)(A)) are given priority. But these are the exception and they do
not figure significantly in large cases. See Baird, Bris & Zhu, supra note 4.
22

23

See supra note 13.
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ues from publicly available sources, putting a price on the company as a
going concern was a more difficult endeavor. One had to know the fu‐
ture plans for the company and what the plausible projections were for
the future revenue stream. These both required information that the
company had but that outsiders did not. Indeed, the creditors had no
legal entitlement to such information.24
The answer to these problems was to give a central role to a commit‐
tee to represent the interests of the unsecured creditors. The committee
would be staffed with creditors, presumptively those holding the seven
largest claims against the debtor.25 The existence of the committee pro‐
vided a mechanism by which private information could be shared with
the creditors. The committee would negotiate on behalf of the unse‐
cured creditors as a group. Moreover, the committee would be able to
collect the information that it needed in order to make an informed
judgment. It could hire accountants to investigate the books of the com‐
pany. It could hire investment bankers to assess what options the com‐
pany had. It enjoy the broad power to “investigate the acts, conduct, as‐
sets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the
debtor’s business and the desirability of the continuance of such busi‐
ness, and any other matter relevant to the case.”26 The court would ap‐
prove the law firms that the committee hired.27 Moreover, the debtor
would pay for all of the committee professionals, such as investment
bankers and accountants.28 Because the Code assumed that the secured
creditors would be paid in full and the general creditors would receive
the residual, the effect of having the debtor pay was to spread the ex‐
penses among all of the general, unsecured creditors.

One of us discussed the central role valuation plays in Chapter 11 at
length in Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation
Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930 (2006).
24

25

11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (2006).

11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2) (2006). See also § 1103(a) (giving the committee the
power to employ “attorneys, accountants, or other agents”).
26

27

11 U.S.C. § 328(a)(1) (2006).

28

Id.
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The creditors on the committee had both a fiduciary duty and an
economic interest to represent the group of unsecured creditors as a
whole. The case law established that those on the committee had to rep‐
resent the interests of the unsecured creditors as a group.29 By and large,
this duty corresponded with the economic interest of the creditors. In
theory, a creditor would maximize the value of its own claim by maxi‐
mizing the value distributed to the unsecured creditors as a group.
The creditors’ committee is a portal into the bankruptcy process.
While any individual creditor has to pay its own costs should it seek to
participate in the reorganization proceeding, the creditors’ committee
can hire counsel and advisors and have these fees reimbursed by the
estate as an administrative expense.30 Also, the creditors’ committee can
extract concessions from the debtor. The debtor would be hard‐pressed
to confirm a plan of reorganization over the active opposition of the
creditors’ committee. As such, the debtor has reason to listen to its con‐
cerns.
This approach—one that assumes common interests among dis‐
persed creditors—fits awkwardly with what we find today. By the time
of the bankruptcy, unsecured claims are in the hands of distressed debt
professionals.31 They often hold complicated positions, combining ordi‐
nary claims with derivative instruments. They pursue their own agen‐
das. Rather than dispersed and homogenous, they are close at hand,
well informed, and radically different from one another. As a result, the
idea of a committee as the principal vehicle for mediating the interests
of the general creditors as a group may no longer work. Having a seat
on the creditors’ committee can provide an investor with a good deal of
input into the way in which a bankruptcy case proceeds. At the same
time, however, someone on the creditors’ committee is supposed to at‐
tend to the interests of the general creditors as a whole. Reconciling the
See, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 717, 722
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that the fiduciary duty “extends to the class as a
whole, not to its individual members”).
29

11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006) (authorizing the committee to hire profession‐
als); § 328(a)(1) (providing for payment of fees).
30

31

See note 7 supra.
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traditional committee structure with the new type of player requires
forcing disclosures from the investor and limiting her range of action,
especially with respect to trading.32 Whether this can be done in a way
that keeps the largest players at the bargaining table has proved hard.33
In an environment in which sitting at the bargaining table exposes par‐
ticipants to inside information, the most important players often want to
stay in the shadows.34 This is an inversion of the traditional process, one
in which those with the most at stake wanted to be on the creditors’
committee, rather than stay away from it.
B. Claims Trading
The changing composition of creditors in Chapter 11 is due more
than any other reason to the rise in claims trading. The ability to trade in
claims against a Chapter 11 debtor has existed for over twenty years.35
The increased presence and financial wherewithal of hedge funds, how‐
ever, has increased the importance of this aspect of reorganization prac‐

For a discussion of disclosure obligations in bankruptcy and in particu‐
lar the way they contrast with disclosure obligations outside of bankruptcy, see
Robert D. Drain & Elizabeth J. Schwartz, Are Bankruptcy Claims Subject to the
Federal Securities Laws?, 10 AM. BANK. INST. L. REV. 569 (2002).
32

For a discussion of how so‐called “Chinese Walls” may be used to miti‐
gate this problem, see infra note 58.
33

See Huebner & Tisdell, supra note 6, at 82 (“[M]embers of senior lender
groups now frequently decline to receive company information so they can re‐
main unrestricted and capable of purchasing and selling public subordinated
debt. In some recent cases, only a handful of senior lenders have been willing to
receive non‐public information, making it impossible to include the vast major‐
ity of lenders in reorganisation plan negotiations.”).
34

See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking
Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 1‐3 (1990) (describ‐
ing claims trading in various bankruptcies dating back to 1986); Robert K. Ras‐
mussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law,
3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 101 n.71 (1995) (citing statistics on the growth of
the claims trading market from the mid‐1980s into the mid‐1990s).
35
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tice.36 The basic rationale for claims trading is simple. It allows easy exit
for those who are ill‐equipped to navigate it.
Chapter 11 cases can be drawn‐out affairs.37 When a debtor files for
Chapter 11, the debtor is prohibited from paying pre‐petition debt.38
Payments on such obligations await the end of the case, absent a show‐
ing that immediate payment makes creditors as a group better off.39 But
the holders of some claims, such as suppliers of goods and services,
never expected be a long‐term investor in the enterprise and do not
want to wait until the end of the proceeding for payment. They are not
set up to participate in the Chapter 11 proceeding. They have little
knowledge of the ins and outs of bankruptcy practice. Perhaps even
more importantly, their business model is not built around tying up

See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization
Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty‐First Century?, 78
AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 181 (2004) (noting that “distressed debt trading has grown
to proportions never contemplated at the time of the enactment of the Bank‐
ruptcy Reform Act”); Glenn E. Siegel, Introduction: ABI Guide to Trading Claims
in Bankruptcy, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 177, 177 (2003) (“Perhaps nothing has
changed the face of bankruptcy in the last decade as much as the newfound
liquidity in claims. . . . Now, in almost every size case, there is an opportunity
for creditors to exit the bankruptcy in exchange for a payment from a distressed
debt trader . . . .”). See also Paul M. Goldschmid, Note, More Phoenix Than Vul‐
ture: The Case for Distressed Investor Presence in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
Process, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 191 (2005) (discussing the growing impor‐
tance of the role distressed debt investors play in Chapter 11).
36

For example, of the 57 companies that were public at the time they filed
for bankruptcy and confirmed reorganization plans in 2005, 26 were in bank‐
ruptcy for over a year, and one was in bankruptcy for almost seven years. See
NEW GENERATIONS RESEARCH, THE 2006 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC
46–47.
37

11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006). Over time, some exceptions have emerged,
most notably for suppliers of goods within twenty days before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (2006).
38

See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004) (disallowing im‐
mediate payment of “critical vendors” in the absence of a showing that the
payment benefited unsecured creditors as a group).
39
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capital in bankruptcy proceedings. Even if the trade creditor still wants
an on‐going relationship with the debtor, it is eager to monetize its
claim for prepetition goods and services. Claims trading allows the
small, distant creditor an easy way out of the bankruptcy process. Un‐
diversified small stakeholders can easily opt out of the bankruptcy
process and receive fair value for their claims provided the market for
claims is sufficiently liquid.40
Claims trading flourishes because it is attractive to buyers as well as
sellers. Those with money to invest can make a profit. An investor with
more knowledge about the likely outcome of the case and a longer time
horizon can make a positive return. One way is by providing liquidity.
They earn a premium from impatient creditors looking to turn their
claims into cash. The new investors may also profit from their ability to
navigate the bankruptcy process. They may be better able to assess how
much the debtor will ultimately be able to pay on its claims. Moreover,
the investor may be able to find overlooked value in the instruments
that the debtor has issued. Either way, the new investor may be able to
use its knowledge of the reorganization process to generate a higher re‐
turn than could the party that owned the claim when the debtor filed for
bankruptcy.41
In some instances, the ability to buy claims allows strategic investors
to gain control of the business. Here it might seem that claims trading
plays the same role as a conventional take‐over contest outside of bank‐
ruptcy, differing only in that the outsider buys debt rather than equity.
Indeed, it is easy to identify bankruptcy cases where the fight for control
was front and center. The most notable example of buying claims to ob‐
As one of us has discussed elsewhere, whether the market for claims is
in fact sufficiently liquid, however, is itself subject to doubt. See Douglas G.
Baird, The Bankruptcy Exchange, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. LAW ●●● (forth‐
coming 2009).
40

For example, just days after essentially buying Kmart out of Chapter 11
bankruptcy for nearly $1 billion, hedge fund ESL Investments it sold some of
Kmart’s undervalued real‐estate assets for $900 million. ESL ultimately profited
over $3 billion from selling off Kmart properties. See Marty Bernstein, Hey,
What’s This Guy up to? WARD’S DEALER BUSINESS, December 1, 2008, at 33.
41
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tain control of a company in bankruptcy is the Kmart reorganization.
ESL Investments, a well‐heeled hedge fund, acquired control by buying
up Kmart’s debt.42 The reorganization plan gave ESL the right to ap‐
point four directors. Edward Lampert, the head of ESL, appointed him‐
self, two of his employees, and a major investor in ESL.43
This market for corporate control, however, is different in a crucial
respect from the one that exists outside of bankruptcy and comes with
its own distinct risks. The Code’s committee structure, by giving all
large creditors a seat at the table, creates a situation where all parties
battling for control of corporations in Chapter 11 are also given a large
role in crafting the reorganization plan at the same time.
The case of Fibermark illustrates some of the problems.44 FiberMark
was a specialty producer of paper products based in Vermont. The
company had been formed in 1989 by a management‐led buyout of a
division of Boise Cascade. The capital structure of the company was rel‐
atively simple. It had a secured credit facility of $85 million. Throughout
the events surrounding FiberMark’s financial distress, the company had
more than sufficient assets to pay off the facility in full, and the secured
lender, GE Capital, did not play a role in the ultimate fight that erupted.
The bulk of the rest of FiberMark’s financing was through public bonds.
These bonds had a face amount of $346 million. The remaining unse‐
cured debt was roughly $12 million.45 In light of this capital structure,
whoever controlled the bond debt would control the outcome of the
See Harner, supra note 2, at 725–27. Other recent examples of acquiring
debt to exercise control include Loews Cineplex Entertainment Corp., Maiden‐
form Brands, Inc., McLeodUSA Inc., National Equipment Services, Inc., New
World Pasta Company, Rand McNally & Co., Regal Entertainment Group, and
XO Communications, Inc. See id. at 707.
42

Id. at 726. See also Edward S. Lampert Appointed Chairman of the Board,
Kmart, PR NEWSWIRE, May 6, 2003.
43

The fight in FiberMark is set out in detail in Report of Havey R. Miller,
as Examiner, In re Fibermark, No. 04‐10463 (Bankr. D. Vt.) (August 16, 2005)
[hereinafter Report].
44

For a brief account of the history and pre‐petition debt structure of Fi‐
bermark, see Report, supra note 44, at 27.
45
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case. It might seem that things should go smoothly, but they did not.
The reorganization proceeding eventually became a brutal fight among
three hedge funds that was only settled after the bankruptcy court in‐
tervened and appointed an examiner to investigate them.46
Two of the hedge funds, AIG Global Investment Corporation and
Post Advisory Group, acquired FiberMark bonds before it filed for
bankruptcy. At the time of the bankruptcy petition, AIG had about nine‐
teen percent of the outstanding notes and Post held another fifteen per‐
cent of the notes. Neither acquired any more notes during the case. They
thus had over a third of the outstanding notes at the time the case began
(which meant that there would not be a consensual reorganization plan
without their approval), and both were appointed to serve on the credi‐
tors’ committee. The indenture trustee for the notes and a trade creditor
holding a $50,000 claim were also appointed to the committee.47
Because the other creditors were not actively involved, Post and es‐
pecially AIG believed that they could control the committee and hence
FiberMark and its reorganization. Moreover, because their holdings
were so large, their interests no longer corresponded with those of other
claimholders. They were like a large controlling shareholder while the
other bondholders were more like minority shareholders. Outside of
bankruptcy, minority shareholders protect themselves through contract,
and they may have some ability to enjoy the control premium.48 By con‐

46

See In re Fibermark, Inc., 330 B.R. 480, 489–93 (D. Vt. 2005).

See Report, supra note 44, at 4. The trade creditor eventually sold its
claim to Silver Point. As part of the sale, the trade creditor agreed to remain on
the creditors’ committee as an agent of Silver Point. Id. at 10.
47

The extent to which minority shareholders must rely on contract varies
by state. Compare Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379–81 (Del. 1993) (en
banc) (noting that minority investors must protect themselves through contract
as the “tools of good corporate practice are designed to give a purchasing mi‐
nority stockholder the opportunity to bargain for protection before parting
with consideration”), with Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076 (Mass. 2006) (not‐
ing that under Massachusetts law shareholders of closely held corporations
owe fiduciary duties to one another and the majority cannot frustrate the “mi‐
nority’s reasonable expectations of benefit” from their ownership of shares).
48
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trast, once in bankruptcy, a creditor holds only a generic “claim.” Any
contractual protections that she obtained outside of bankruptcy disap‐
pear. The Bankruptcy Code homogenizes all claims, as it assumes that
creditors at the same priority level share a common cause. Dissenting
claimholders in a particular class have no ability to protect themselves
through contract. As against the creditor holding a controlling position,
they have the right only to insist that they be paid as much as they
would receive in a liquidation.49
The representative of AIG dominated the creditors’ committee. He
took an active role in the case, worried about the amount of money be‐
ing spent, and tried to direct the actions of the managers on the theory
that the public debt holders were the residual claimants of the com‐
pany.50 At the beginning of the proceeding, he favored a quick reorgani‐
zation plan that basically wiped out the existing equity and converted
the debt to equity.51 Such a course of action would have left AIG as the
largest shareholder and firmly in control of the business. He made it
clear that he had no confidence in the CEO.52
AIG and Post were surprised to learn in the summer of 2004 that
Silver Point, a fund noted for its expertise in investing in distressed
companies, had begun acquiring large quantities notes shortly before
the case began and continued to do so while the case proceeded. Silver
Point was asked to join the creditors’ committee, and by the time it was
appointed in October, it held thirty‐five percent of the public notes. 53
The drama of the case—one that lasted many months—consisted
largely of the negotiations among the three hedge funds on a corporate
governance agreement as to how the company was to be run after bank‐

11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2006).

49
50

Report, supra note 44, at 2–3.

51

Id. at 98–99.

52

Id. at 69–70.

Id. at 4–5. This ability to acquire such a significant stake in the company
without attracting the attention of other major investors illustrates how opaque
the claims trading market can be, even to those who participate in it on a regu‐
lar basis.
53
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ruptcy. Silver Point’s arrival drastically altered the expectations of AIG
and Post. Before they knew of Silver Point’s investments in FiberMark,
they believed that they would end up with de facto control of the reor‐
ganized company. Silver Point’s large stake and intent to continue pur‐
chasing bonds made it clear that Silver Point would be the controlling
shareholder of any reorganized company. (Indeed, it appears that Silver
Point eventually acquired more than fifty percent of the outstanding
bonds, resulting in the three hedge fends holding well over eighty per‐
cent of the unsecured debt.54) Once AIG and Post saw the changed land‐
scape, they focused on minimizing the power that Silver Point would
have as the controlling shareholder of the reorganized FiberMark.55
When Silver Point came into the picture, the prospects for a quick
reorganization evaporated. Basically, the three hedge funds could never
reach agreement among themselves as to the respective rights of the
three running the company post petition. What had been a corporate
reorganization transformed itself into an ugly take‐over battle in which
AIG and Post, like entrenched board members, used their position on
the creditors’ committee to further their own interests rather than to ad‐
vance the interest of the creditors as a group.56
In FiberMark, the parties reached agreement only after a blistering
report issued by the court‐appointed examiner. To be sure, the parties
involved took issue with many of the findings of the report, but the
highly public report did refocus the parties’ negotiations. It resulted in
an agreement under which Silver Point bought out the interests of the
other hedge funds as well as the notes held by other investors.57 Fiber‐
Mark illustrates the potential and perils of a world in which the liquid‐
ity of claims itself makes coalition building difficult. In addition, it un‐

54

Id. at 8.

55

Report, supra note 44, at 5–8.

See Terry Brennan, Bankrupt, FORBES, Oct. 31, 2005, at 60 (calling Fiber‐
Mark “the ugliest Chapter 11 case of the year” and summarizing much of Mil‐
ler’s report).
56

57

2006.

See Terry Brennan, Turmoil Over, FiberMark Exits, DAILY DEAL, Jan. 5,
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derscores how one of the basic mechanisms of the Bankruptcy Code
may no longer function effectively. Large creditors are active and pursu‐
ing their own agendas (such as gaining control of the corporation), and
they cannot be trusted to represent everyone’s interests when serving on
the committee. Moreover, because committee members receive confi‐
dential information, some large players will no longer even want to
serve.58
II. The Transformation of Secured Debt
A. The Decline of the Traditional Bank
There is no more stock character in the discussion of bankruptcy
policy than the senior bank. The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code as‐
sumed that secured creditors, principally banks, could be trusted to look
out for themselves. The bank has made a large loan to the company and
has a security interest in most, if not all, of the company’s assets. The
financial interest of the bank is relatively straightforward. If it can real‐
ize the value of its collateral, it will be paid in full. As such, the lender
has an incentive to turn its collateral into cash via some form of sale.
Left to its own devices, the senior lender would sell the discrete asset in
which it had a security interest, and this would lead to the closure of the
business. The lender is biased toward liquidation. Because it does not
share in the upside should the debtor’s fortunes improve, it does not
take such possibilities into account. Rather, if it can force a liquidation
today, it can be paid in full. It sees no need to risk continuation that can

Sometimes a hedge fund will be allowed to participate on the committee
and be allowed to trade provided it erects a “Chinese wall” that blocks infor‐
mation acquired while sitting on the committee from being used. In practice,
however, these walls have proved porous. See Daniel Sullivan, Comment, Big
Boys and Chinese Walls, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 557 (2008) (noting that “trading
walls are not a panacea and there are certain harms they cannot prevent”). An
example of such a screening wall was used in the Fibermark bankruptcy. Silver
Point agreed to join the committee only on the condition that it be allowed to
continue trading in debtor’s notes so the court entered an order establishing the
wall. See Report, supa note 41, at 5.
58
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only reduce its return. Even if the company is to be sold, the bank can‐
not be trusted if it is owed less than the company is worth. In this situa‐
tion, the bank may not seek top dollar. It will only look for a sale that
pays it in full. Given these incentives, the bank should not have its hand
on the levers of control.59
Two changes in bank lending practice render this account obsolete.
The first is the rise of the syndicated loan.60 Single banks no longer make
loans to large businesses. Given the amount of these loans, any bank
that funded the loan itself would be tying up a hefty portion of its capi‐
tal with a single borrower. To take a simple example, assume that we
have ten banks and ten borrowers. Each borrower wants to borrow $200
million, and there is a ten percent chance that any given borrower will
default during the term of the loan. In a world where loans were funded
by a single bank, any bank loaning $200 million would have a ten per‐
cent risk that a large portion of its capital would end up in default.
Syndication allows the banks to reduce this risk. By parceling out
each loan among a consortium of banks, each bank can lessen its default
risk. In our example, if each bank signed up to fund ten percent of each
borrower, it would have mitigated its risk. To be sure, by participating
in more loans it is more likely that some debtor in its portfolio will de‐
fault. Each bank expects to have to deal with a default on a $20 million
commitment. It is much easier, however, for each bank to handle a $20
million default rather than a $200 million default. In exchange for taking
on a greater risk that it will have to deal with some default, each bank
has greatly reduced the risk that it will have a default that would threat‐
en the viability of the bank.
See JACKSON, supra note 13, at 181–89 (asserting that secured creditors
should receive the value of their rights, but the decision as to the fate of the
corporation should be left to the general creditors).
59

Syndicated loans grew from $137 billion in 1987 to more than a trillion in
1997. See Steven A. Dennis & Donald J. Mullineaux, Syndicated Loans, 9 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 404, 407 (2000). For a general discussion of syndicated lending,
see ANDREW FIGHT, SYNDICATED LENDING (2004). See also AGASHA MUGASHA,
THE LAW OF MULTI‐BANK FINANCING: SYNDICATED LOANS AND THE SECONDARY
LOAN MARKET (2007).
60
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For each loan, one of the banks takes the lead role. It is charged with
monitoring the debtor and overseeing the interests of the creditors as a
group.61 Befitting the lead bank’s status as the leader of the syndicate,
the expectation developed that the lead bank would hold a portion of
the loan that was larger than any other member.62 By holding a share
that was disproportionate to that of the other members of the syndicate,
the lead bank would take a bigger economic hit should it fail to maxi‐
mize the value of the loan. Making such a commitment made the loan
easier to sell to other lenders.63
The lending agreement contained various covenants. The docu‐
ments provided the lender with access to information generally un‐
available to other investors. It could use this information to monitor the
borrower. If the borrower tripped up a covenant, it would have to pro‐
cure a waiver. The contract governing the syndicate did not grant the
lead bank the unilateral right to grant a waiver; rather, the waiver had
to be approved by syndicate members. For the most part, however, syn‐
dicated members would follow the recommendation of the lead bank as
they had less knowledge about the borrower, but the same economic
interests and instincts as the lead bank.64
For a discussion of loan syndication and typical structures, see Katerina
Simons, Why do Banks Syndicate Loans?, 1993 NEW ENG. ECON. REV. 45.
61

See Amir Sufi, Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evi‐
dence from Syndicated Loans, 62 J. FIN. 629, 633 (2007) (“lead arranger typically
holds a larger share of the loan than any of the participants”).
62

See id. at 665 (concluding that lead arrangers retain a larger portion of
the loan when information asymmetry concerns are greatest, such as when the
borrower is opaque). A number of factors, including the legal rights available to
creditors in particular jurisdiction, affect the composition of the lending syndi‐
cate. See Benjamin C. Esty & William L. Megginson, Creditor Rights, Enforcement,
and Debt Ownership: Evidence from the Global Syndicated Loan Market, 38 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 37 (2003) (suggesting a relation between syndicate
structure and legal risk).
63

See Sufi, supra note 62, at 632 (“[T]he lead arranger typically acts as the
‘agent’ bank that monitors the firm, governs the terms of the loan, administers
the drawdown of funds, calculates interest payments, and enforces financial
covenants.”).
64
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Syndication has been with us for several decades. Initially, it had lit‐
tle effect on bankruptcy practice. Many syndicate members were banks,
and while at some level they were competitors, they also were repeat
players. Any bank that reached an agreement with a borrower to fund a
new loan would have to shop the loan to its brethren.65 Other frequent
participants in these syndicates were pension funds looking for a safe
return on their assets.66 These funds did not have the assessment capa‐
bilities of banks, and hence were even more likely to defer to the rec‐
ommendation of the lead bank that arranged the syndicate.
The composition of lending syndicates, however, has changed re‐
cently. Membership is no longer limited to bank and pension funds.
Hedge funds can participate in the syndication stage.67 Moreover, there
is a rapidly developing secondary market in syndicated loans.68 The ad‐
vantage of this market to those lenders participating in the syndicate is
readily apparent. Unless restricted by the lead bank, a member of the
syndicate has an exit option. It can sell its portion of the loan to a willing

See Simons, supra note 61, at 46 (“[T]he lead banks’ concern with main‐
taining their reputations in the marketplace may lead them not only to avoid
abuses but to promote risky loans even less aggressively than safe loans.”),
available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/neer/neer1993/neer193c.pdf.
65

See Agasha Mugasha, The Secondary Market for Syndicated Loans: Loan
Trading, Credit Derivatives, and Collateralized Debt Obligations, 19 BANKING & FIN.
L. REV. 199, 199 (2004) (noting that regular participants in this market include
banks and other financial institutions such as insurance companies, pension
funds, and mutual funds).
66

See Barry Bobrow, Mercedes Tech & Linda Redding, An Introduction to
the Primary Market, in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING
157, 168 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone, eds., 2006) (reporting that hedge
funds represent 29% of primary market for institutional loans with spreads of
LIBOR + 400 basis points or higher in 2005).
67

See Meredith Coffey, Robert Milam, Laura Torrado & Michele B. Pio‐
rowski, The Secondary Loan Market, in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS
AND TRADING, supra note 67, at 393, 415–16 (noting that from 2000 to 2005 hedge
fund trading in the syndicated loan market has risen from 10% to 30% of trad‐
ing volume).
68
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buyer.69 Trading of these loans has increased dramatically in recent
times.70 Thus, when a borrower trips up covenants in its loan or files for
bankruptcy, it will not necessarily be the case that all it has to do is to
come to an understanding with the bank that has funded its senior debt.
Today hedge funds can purchase enough of tranche in the secondary
market so that they have the power to block any waiver of default, pro‐
posed amendment to the credit facility, or plan of reorganization that
does not meet with their approval.71
A hedge fund that holds a position identical to the one held by a
bank at an earlier time may view bad states of the world radically dif‐
ferently.72 It may have bought the loan with the view that in the event of
default it would be left with the business, and given the amount at
which it purchased the notes, it would not be a bad price at which to
acquire it even if it were in financial distress. Banks want their money
See Sang Whi Lee & Donald J. Mullineaux, Monitoring, Financial Distress,
and the Structure of Commercial Lending Syndicates, 33 FIN. MGMT. 107, 118 (2004)
(indicating consent on reselling the loan required in fewer than half of the syn‐
dications); A. Burak Güner, Loan Sales and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing, 19
REV. FIN. STUD. 687 (2006) (explaining why borrowers may dislike loan sales
and suggesting that borrowers receive lower interest rates when they allow
banks to sell participations in the loans). The options provided to banks by the
secondary loan market are in many ways similar to the options that claims
trading in bankruptcy provides to the holders of claims.
69

See Mugasha, supra note 66, at 201 (“[s]econdary loan trading has in‐
creased tenfold in the last five years”).
70

See, e.g., Jonathan Keehner, Caroline Salas & Jason Kelly, Harrah’s Pri‐
vate‐Equity Owners Said to Hedge Against Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG NEWS, March
13, 2009 (private equity firms that already hold equity buying debt to gain con‐
trol of potential bankruptcy of Harrah’s).
71

See Circuit City Unplugged: Why Did Chapter 11 Fail To Save 34,000 Jobs?:
Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the
House Judiciary Comm., 111th Congress, 1st Sess. (2009) (statement of Harvey R.
Miller, senior partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP) [hereinafter Miller Testi‐
mony] (observing, in context of retailer bankruptcies, that financial institutions
and members of lender syndicates have adopted a more distant and shorter
term relationship with their debtor).
72
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back; hedge funds loan to own. The same dynamic that plays out with
respect to publicly traded unsecured debt now plays out with respect to
the traditional bank debt as well.
As we have discussed, the Bankruptcy Code assumes these players
will be interested in liquidating their senior claims. But this is no longer
the case. Far from having a liquidation bias, a hedge fund may affirma‐
tively want to advance a reorganization plan in which it ends up with
the equity of the business. Rather than push for a market sale, it prefers
a judicial process that it can control. Not only can it push for a low valu‐
ation, but the managers of the business, people whose options will be
reset upon emergence from Chapter 11, will push for a low valuation as
well.73
In short, the senior lender in the identical place in the capital struc‐
ture is doing exactly the opposite of its traditional counterpart. Instead
of fleeing from the Chapter 11 process, it embraces it. Rather than ter‐
minating its relationship with the business, it wants to run it. Rather
than fighting the managers, it takes control both through conditions im‐
posed on debtor‐in‐possession financing and by installing new officers,
most typically a chief restructuring officer (CRO).74
B. The Second Lien Loan
It is not even the case anymore that the different players junior to
the secured tranche will be general creditors. As we have noted, most
debtors that file for bankruptcy tend to have a senior secured creditor.
That creditor (or, more precisely, that lending syndicate) will have a se‐
curity interest in virtually all of the assets of the company. The secured
In Part III we take account of the rise of credit default swaps. These new
investment vehicles can provide another reason for a party holding a part of a
syndicated loan to favor a formal default rather than a workout.
73

See Miller Testimony, supra note 72, at 5 (“The chapter 11 process, as con‐
templated in 1978, has been overwhelmed by marginalization of the debtor in
possession, expansion of creditor (particularly secured creditor) control, the
increasing imposition of creditor‐designated chief restructuring officers
(CROs), claims trading, more complex debt and organizational structures, and
short‐term profit motivation.”).
74
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debt, however, will not exhaust the borrowing capacity of the business.
Borrowers in need of additional funds can still borrow from lenders will
to take a junior position (in return for a higher interest rate). In years
past, the debtor would access this additional value through mezzanine
financing on an unsecured basis. In the 1980s, this financing was pro‐
vided by savings‐and‐loan associations and insurance companies.75
These were relatively passive investors who had little ability to affect
the operation of the company. To the extent that any investor was moni‐
toring the debtor, it was the lead bank in the lending syndicate.
Today, however, we see a new trend in the capital markets. The deb‐
tor accesses the difference between the senior loan and full enterprise
value through a second lien loan.76 The lenders take a security interest in
the same assets as does the first lender. Their right to payment, by and
large, is not subordinated to the senior debt. Maturity schedules are set
so that the borrower is required to make payments on both loans. The
second lien lenders can seek to be repaid at the same time as the senior
lender is being repaid. Moreover, unlike subordinated debt, they do not
have to pay any monies that they collect to the senior debt. Rather, they
are second only in terms of their claim on the collateral package. Only
when collateral is sold for cash does the senior lender have first dibs.77
The second lien market has exploded over the last several years.78 As

See CORRY SILBERNAGEL & DAVIS VAITKUNAS, BOND CAPITAL, MEZZANINE
FINANCE
6
(Jan.
2006),
http://www.bondcapital.ca/media/Bond_Capital_Mezzanine_Finance.pdf.
75

See Marc Hanrahan & David Teh, Second Lien Loans, in THE HANDBOOK
LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING, supra note 67, at 108, 110 (noting that
second lien loan financings are now a widely used financing tool, often selected
by borrowers in lieu of unsecured high‐yield debt or traditional unsecured
mezzanine financing).
76
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See Id.

In 2003, second lien issuance in the North American market totaled just
under $8 billion, but the amount was over $29 billion in 2006. Gary D. Cham‐
blee, Reducing Battles Between First and Second Lien Holders Through Intercreditor
Agreements: The Role of the New ABA Model Intercreditor Agreement Task Force, 12
N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 1 (2008) (citing statistics from the Loan Pricing Corpora‐
78
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with syndicated first lien loans, there is a robust secondary market for
second lien loans.79
The second lender only comes onto the scene with the blessing of the
first lender. This necessity for consent arises because the loan docu‐
ments surrounding the senior loan typically restrict the ability of the
borrower to grant a competing security interest in the company’s assets.
Few lenders would make a loan that would give the borrower the unfet‐
tered ability to pledge the collateral it is relying on to another lending
group. Thus, to the extent that the borrower wants to obtain financing
based on a second lien, it needs the consent of its primary lender.80
The second loan benefits the first lender in that it puts more money
into the business. This money can be used to generate additional reve‐
nues, some of which will be used to make payments to the senior lend‐
er. Yet the senior lender needs some assurances that the new lender—
which as with the senior loan is usually a group of lenders—will not
cause it undue hardship. Granting a lien has consequences, both outside
of bankruptcy and inside of bankruptcy. A second lien holder, by virtue
of its lien, can grab its collateral. After a bankruptcy petition has been
filed, it can object to the use of its collateral and seek adequate protec‐
tion of its interest. Hedge funds are primary purchasers of second lien
debt.81 They are well versed in pushing to the limit whatever legal rights
they may have and contesting whatever limits the senior lienholder has
tried to place on them.

tion). Although the market continued to grow, reaching $15.21 billion in the
second quarter of 2007 alone, the credit crunch that hit the financial markets
dropped the total back to $4.56 billion for the fourth quarter of 2007. Id.
See Hanrahan & Teh, supra note 76, at 110 n.3 (noting that collateralized
debt obligation collateralized loan obligation funds have started incorporating
second lien loans into their portfolios).
79

See id. at 112 (“The concern [of first lien lenders] in times past has been
that the existence of other secured creditors and their rights in collateral could
result in complications for first lien lenders in the event of a workout or bank‐
ruptcy.”)
80

81

See Harner, supra note 2, at 715 n.45.
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The lynchpin of second lien financing is the intercreditor agree‐
ment.82 This contract specifies the relationship between the two lenders.
It addresses in detail their respective rights should the borrower file for
bankruptcy. For example, the intercreditor agreement often grants the
senior lender the right to sell the collateral without the consent of the
second lien lender.83 The intercreditor agreement also typically gives the
senior lender the right to finance the debtor post‐petition and provides
that this financing will have priority over the loan of the second lien
lender.84
The effect of second liens has yet to be felt. The Code has proven suf‐
ficiently flexible (and the judges and the lawyers sufficiently creative) to
overcome the problems that have arisen so far. For example, as a result
of the increase in secured debt, many cases now enter bankruptcy ad‐
ministratively insolvent.85 After the secured creditors are paid, there are
no funds to pay for the costs of the reorganization. But a practice has
emerged in which the secured creditor agrees to “carve out” a part of its
lien to fund the costs of running the proceeding.86 Now widely accepted,
the debate is only over the extent of the carve‐out. But doubt exists
about other features of these new capital structures, especially the en‐

See C. Edward Dobbs, Negotiating Points in Second lien Financing Transac‐
tions, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 189 (2006) (summarizing the significant issues
faced in intercreditor agreements). See also Chamblee, supra note 78; George H.
Singer, The Lender’s Guide to Second lien Financing, 125 BANKING L.J. 199 (2008).
82

See Chamblee, supra note 78, at 18 (indicating that the ABA Model Inter‐
creditor Agreement permits sales by the senior lender under section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code without consent of the second lien lender). See also Dobbs,
supra note 82, at 218‐19.
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See Dobbs, supra note 82, at 211–15.

Under the Code, secured creditors receive the value of their collateral
first. After that, the administrative costs of bankruptcy are paid. See supra note
15 and accompanying text. A case is said to be “administratively insolvent”
when there is insufficient funds to pay off the administrative expenses.
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For an excellent discussion of the issues surrounding carve‐outs, see Ri‐
chard Levin, Almost All You Ever Wanted to Know about Carve Out, 76 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 445 (2002).
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forceability of provisions of the intercreditor agreement that tie the sec‐
ond lienholders hands during the bankruptcy process.87
If parties find it in their interest to have a hierarchical capital struc‐
ture with multiple tiers of secured debt, there seems to be no bank‐
ruptcy policy that justifies second‐guessing them. To be sure, it does re‐
quire a shifting of the way bankruptcy is paid for. If the second lien po‐
sition is the fulcrum security—the security which is in the money but
not being paid in full—then the reorganization is being run for the sec‐
ond lien lenders’ benefit and they should pay for it. The modern bank‐
ruptcy judge sees herself as charged with creating a forum in which the
stakeholders, whoever they may be, come together and negotiate. As
long as an agreement adequately deals with the substantive and proce‐
dural rights of all involved, it is not for her to question its details, any
more than it is for the New York Stock Exchange to review the price at
which a given stock trades. She is indifferent to whether the agreement
provides for an auction of the assets (as became increasingly the case
over the past decade) or sets out a traditional plan of reorganization,
spelling out in elaborate detail the capital structure of the reorganized
firm (which has become increasingly rare, although it could return in
today’s environment). What matters is that the process is cost‐effective
and protects the rights of all the stakeholders.
C. The Rise of Control
More troubling than the existence of multiple levels of secured debt
is the way in which secured creditors have ceased to be passive. This is
in tension with the Bankruptcy Code’s assumption of a passive role for
the secured creditor. Indeed, under old Chapter XI (which Chapter 11
supplanted in addition to old Chapter X in 1978), there was no mecha‐
nism for altering the rights of secured creditors.88 Liens passed through
For example, a provision that takes away from the second lienholder to
exercise its right to vote on the plan of reorganization is suspect. See Dobbs,
supra note 82, at 221 n.64 (setting out the differing views of courts on whether
junior creditors can give up voting rights in bankruptcy).
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See Bankruptcy Act §§ 356, 357, 11 U.S.C. §§ 756, 757 (repealed 1978);
SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 452 (1940).
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bankruptcy unaffected.89 The problem with the capital structure was
with the general creditors. It was their claims that needed to be restruc‐
tured in order to return the business to financial health. Chapter 11 fol‐
lowed in the same fashion. It assumes that the general creditors are the
residual owners of the business.
As long as there is an equity cushion,90 secured creditors are al‐
lowed interest and fees arising from their claim.91 The secured creditor is
entitled to “adequate protection” that ensures that the value of its col‐
lateral remains undiminished.92 It takes none of the risks of the reor‐
ganization, but it is entitled to none of the upside. Adequate protection
cannot take the form of equity in the reorganized business.93 If the plan
leaves its security interest intact, it does not have any voice in the reor‐
ganization.94 Changes to the secured creditor’s claim can affect only the
terms on which it is being repaid. The plan can stetch out payments, but
collateral must back it up, and fully adjusting for risk the note it is given
must equal the value of its claim.95
Senior creditors over the last two decades have learned how to gain
more control over their debtor outside of bankruptcy.96 The security in‐
This principle is one of very long standing. See Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S.
617 (1886).
89

See In re Mellor, 734 F.2d 1396, 1400 n.2 (9th Cir., 1984) (“ ’Equity cush‐
ion’ has been defined as the value in the property, above the amount owed to
the creditor with a secured claim, that will shield that interest from loss due to
any decrease in the value of the property during time [sic] the automatic stay
remains in effect.”).
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11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2006).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2006).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (2006).

94

11 U.S.C. § 1124 (2006).
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11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2006).

See George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19,
24‐25 (2004) (“[S]ecured creditors capitalizing upon agency problems to gain
the help of insiders and insolvency professionals [have] effectively take[n] over
– or ‘hijack[ed]’ – the chapter 11 process and essentially create[d] a federal uni‐
fied foreclosure process.”); Stephen J. Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter
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terest covers more assets and the lead lender controls all the cash that
passes through the business. Moreover, secured creditors have learned,
largely through debtor in possession (DIP) financing, how to gain con‐
trol over the debtor during the bankruptcy itself.97 The increase in con‐
trol rights, combined with the hetereogeneity in the most senior tranche,
increases the risk that creditors pursuing their own individual agendas
will not advance the interests of creditors as a group.
When the senior creditor is the DIP lender, many of the restraints
on individual creditors, such as the automatic stay, loosen considerably.
Typically, if there is a default under the DIP loan (which can include
such things as a failure to meet income projections or maintain sufficient
cash reserves), the DIP lender can pursue its rights notwithstanding the
automatic stay.98 This creates few problems when the DIP facility is in

11, 93 KY. L.J. 839, 841‐42 (2005) (“[I]t is not clear that this development pro‐
motes social welfare. Rather, lender control may only benefit lenders.”); Harvey
R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, The Creditor in Possession: Creditor Control of Chap‐
ter 11 Reorganization Cases, 21 BANKR. STRATEGIST 1, 2 (2003) (“The excuse . . . of
remedial rights given secured creditors upon the occurrence of default, in ef‐
fect, puts those creditors in control of the debtor/borrower.”); Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 799 (2004)
(“[W]idespread adoption of a privatized system depending upon dominant
security interests is as undesirable as it is unlikely.”).
See Miller Testimony, supra note 72, at 11–12 (detailing commonly ap‐
proved provisions in DIP financing orders, including: appointment of a CRO
acceptable to the lender; cash‐flow covenants that may compel the sale of assets
or downsizing; provisions giving the lender control over disposition of the deb‐
tor’s assets; drop‐dead dates or terms that provide for successively lowered
advances to encourage liquidation; provisions that provide for the sale of the
debtor or its assets within the limited period of time; provisions that subject the
debtor’s plan of reorganization to some form of lender control, such as not al‐
lowing the debtor to file a plan of reorganization without lender consent, con‐
ditioning debtor exclusivity on lender consent, requiring the filing of a plan by
a certain day, or specifying the contents of the plan).
97

See Scott D. Cousins, Postpetition Financing of Dot‐Coms, 27 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 759, 793 (2002) (“Regardless of whether the DIP lender is also the prepetition
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the hands of a single lead bank. But the situation becomes significantly
more complicated when those providing the DIP financing are a group
of competing hedge funds, each pursuing its own agenda.99 In theory,
an agreement can be put in place that ensures that, at least with respect
to the terms of the DIP loan, the disparate lenders act as one. But wheth‐
er they can craft such agreements remains to be seen.
III. Financial Innovation
The changes described above drastically alter the bankruptcy land‐
scape. They are changes, however, that standing alone the bankruptcy
system could well assimilate. Indeed, we see many parts of the com‐
pany’s capital structure crafted with a potential bankruptcy in mind.
Intercreditor agreements, for example, focus explicitly on the relative
rights of two classes of creditors will have in bankruptcy.100 All things
being equal, one would expect that today’s capital structures would aid
the resolution of financial distress. Yet not all things are equal.
The Bankruptcy Code assumes that investors hold a single type of
investment in the company. Shareholders own shares; creditors have
debt, with banks holding secured debt. The Code itself provides for se‐
cured claims, unsecured claims, interests, and pretty much nothing
else.101 When we think back to when the Code was drafted in the 1970s,

lender, DIP orders often vacate the automatic stay upon the declaration of an
event of default and after the expiration of a short period of time . . . .”).
We see exactly this problem in the Lyondell reorganization, where vari‐
ous hedge funds such as Silver Point and Appaloosa, competed vigorously to
gain shares of the DIP loan. See Tiffany Kary, Lyondell Case Shows Bankruptcy
Loans Are Available for a Price, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 4, 2009.
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See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 82, at 202 (setting out the “remedy block”
first lienholders seek and limits second lienholders try to place on them).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006) (distinguishing between secured claims and
unsecured claims) and § 501(a) (allowing equity security holders to file an in‐
terest). See also § 1129(b) (defining cram down procedure for secured claims,
unsecured claims, and interests). In recent years, the Bankruptcy Code has been
amended so that many varieties of swap and derivative transactions entered
101
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these were the basic investments in a company. One could of course
find some additional securities, but they were pretty much the excep‐
tion. Put differently, the roots of the Bankruptcy Code predate Black‐
Scholes.102
In this world, it was relatively simple to ascertain the incentives of
any investor. All wanted to maximize the return on their investment,
but the nature of their investment dictated their optimal strategy. Se‐
cured creditors wanted safety; they were in the money and saw no need
to take gambles. Equity holders, in contrast, wanted to swing for the
fences. Only a dramatic turnaround would allow them to see a return
on their investments. Unsecured creditors, by and large, tended to favor
value‐increasing changes. While no party had incentives aligned with
the fortunes of the business as a whole, all were confident that they
could identify the motives attending to each investor.
In this world, many companies could restructure their operations
outside of a formal Chapter 11 proceeding. Chapter 11 provided the
benchmark against which negotiations took place. Indeed, in recent
years, even when Chapter 11 was used it was part of a process where
the company would file to either implement a restructuring already
agreed upon or to sell off the company.103 Fewer and fewer companies
entered bankruptcy in a free‐fall state. Bankruptcy was not a discon‐
tinuous event, but rather a tool in an arsenal of those deciding the fate of
the business.

into by the debtor are excepted from bankruptcy altogether. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
§§ 362(b)(27), 555, 556 (2006).
See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 649–54 (1973) (deriving a valuation formula for
options and applying it corporate liabilities); Robert C. Merton, Theory of Ra‐
tional Option Pricing, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 141, 141–42 (1973) (extending
the Black‐Scholes theory of option pricing). For an accessible discussion of how
financial innovation alters our perception of capital structures, see Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 460, 465–70 (1993).
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See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55
STANFORD L. REV. 751, 751–52 (2002).
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Events of the last few years, however, have altered the terrain. Ad‐
dressing financial distress before the filing for bankruptcy has become
much more difficult, as has making decisions once the company has
filed for Chapter 11.
A. Derivatives
Ascertaining economic interests is crucial to assessing bankruptcy
policy. Investments come with both cash flow rights and control rights.
Shareholders can vote for the board of directors. Creditors can invoke
the machinery of the state to collect their debts. More importantly, credit
contracts often give lenders the ability to affect the business in various
ways. In the extreme case, the rights that a senior creditor has by virtue
of its lending agreement give it the power to engineer a change in the
corner office.104 As a general matter, cash flow rights and control rights
work in tandem. It is the investor’s cash flow rights that give it the in‐
centive to exercise its control rights in a certain manner. We normally
assume that an investor exercising a control right granted by a financial
instrument is acting so as to maximize the value of that instrument.
Credit default swaps have rendered this assumption obsolete. A
credit default swap is a two‐party contract under which one party (the
protection seller) acquires the credit risk of a loan from a counterparty
(the protection buyer) in exchange for a fee. If there is a default or some
other “credit event” (such as bankruptcy) on the loan, the protection
buyer receives cash equal to the face value of the loan.105 For example, a
holder of a GM bond may enter into a credit default swap that provides
that, if GM defaults on the bond, the holder can give the bond to its

See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Miss‐
ing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1209 (2006) (“When a
business stumbles, creditors typically enjoy powers that public shareholders
never have, such as the ability to replace the managers and install those more to
their liking.”)
104

See Lubben, supra note 7, at 411–12 (listing bankruptcy, failure to pay,
and restructuring as typical credit events). For more information on credit deri‐
vates, see generally Frank Partnoy & David Skeel, The Promise and Perils of Cre‐
dit Derivatives, 75 U. CINN. L. REV. 1019 (2007).
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counterparty in exchange for the face amount of the bond. In essence,
the parties have “swapped” the risk of default. The extent of this market
is quite large. There is no requirement that one actually own the under‐
lying credit instrument in order to purchase a credit default swap. In‐
deed, the nominal value of credit default swaps is nearly $55 trillion, far
greater than the amount of debt outstanding.106
Credit default swaps are in the first instance merely another way for
a lender to reduce its risk exposure, just as lenders do with the syndica‐
tion process. Just as a bank faces less risk when it only has a piece of a
$200 million loan than when it funds the entire loan itself, a bank that
buys a credit default swap reduces its exposure to an even greater de‐
gree.107 Indeed, the advocates for credit default swaps once argued that
they promise to bring stability to the banking system.108 Banks by and
large remain the originators of large loans. Private institutions such as
hedge funds simply do not (at least yet) have the back office operations
necessary to service a large loan and often rely on prime brokers and
investment banks to provide support services.109 Credit default swaps
See International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Summaries of Mar‐
ket Survey Results, http://www.isda.org (follow “Surveys and Market Statistics”
hyperlink; then follow “Summaries of Market Survey Results” hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 7, 2009) (“The notional amount outstanding of credit default swaps
(CDS) dropped 12 percent to $54.6 trillion in the first half of 2008. CDS notional
growth was 20 percent for the year as a whole.”); Gillian Tett, Unbound, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at 11 (“[T]he CDS market is now 10 times larger than the
tangible cash bonds on which they are supposed to be based.”).
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See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 105, at 1023 (noting that credit default
swaps give banks a method of shedding risk without the costs of negotiating
the syndications and working with other banks and without sharing the bene‐
fits of the loan).
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See id. at 1024 (describing the view of Alan Greenspan and others that
credit default swaps serve as a “shock absorber” and provide systemic bene‐
fits).
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For a discussion of the industry that services hedge funds, see Steve
Bills, JPM Buys Into Hedge Fund Middle Office, AMERICAN BANKER, February 14,
2006, at 1 (discussing J.P. Morgan’s strategy for competing in the business of
servicing hedge funds)..
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allow the banks to offload some the risk of default outside the banking
system. By removing risk from the banking system, this should bolster
the banks’ position should the economy hit a downturn or at least so the
story went.110
Financing that leads to investment in the business grow out of a ne‐
gotiating dynamic in which it was in the self‐interest of everyone to take
account of the interests of the company itself. By contrast, credit default
swaps are created without the input of the borrowing company.111 In‐
deed, some were created by investors with no current interest in the
company at all. They are often side bets in which parties care only about
“credit events,” events that trigger settlement obligations under the
swap. For example, the seller of a credit default swap will fight vigor‐
ously to prevent a bankruptcy filing from taking place and the buyer
will affirmatively encourage it, regardless of whether filing makes any
sense for the company. This failure to attend to the interaction between
these new investments and the bankruptcy process threatens to put un‐
precedented strain on the current system of addressing financial dis‐
tress.
Buying a credit default swap differs from syndication in terms of
control rights. When a lead bank sells part of the loan, it bundles with
that loan any applicable control rights. Any waiver of an event of de‐
fault needs to be agreed to by the syndicate. The agent may be able to
cajole syndicate members to follow its recommendation, but it is still the

Indeed, the proponents of credit default swaps have touted their ability
to reduce the risk to the banking system. See supra note 108. But see Partnoy &
Skeel, supra note 105, at 1040 (noting that credit default swaps also raise sys‐
temic concerns because a “rush to unwind a vast array of interconnected con‐
tracts could create serious liquidity problems in the financial marketsʺ). Credit
default swaps have in fact been blamed for the current financial meltdown. See,
e.g., Matthew Phillips, The Monster That Ate Wall Street: How ‘Credit Default
Swaps’—an Insurance Against Bad Loans—Turned from a Smart Bet into a Killer,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 2008, at 46.
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See Lubben, supra note 7, at 411 (“The debtor on the referenced obliga‐
tion is not a party to the swap, and in most cases is unaware of the transac‐
tion.”).
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case that those who own the loan have to make the decision. If you sell
your piece of the loan in the secondary market, you lose your ability to
have an input on any decisions that the syndicate has to make.
When a lender purchases a credit default swap, however, it retains
the control rights that accompany the loan. If a waiver of an event of
default is needed, the holder of the loan is free to vote as it sees fit. But
now its economic interest has changed. In the extreme case, if the lender
has purchased more credit default swaps than it has at risk in terms of
the loan itself, it may be the case that it will be to its financial advantage
if the loan goes into default.112 In the extreme, those who bought credit
protection on loans they did not hold may subsequently buy loans in
the secondary market for the purpose of preventing a workout and forc‐
ing a default.113 While such a default and subsequent bankruptcy case
may provide a lower return on its debt instrument than it would have
received had the debtor procured a waiver, it may more than make up
for this by collecting on its credit default swap contract.
Such a shift in incentives is almost impossible for others in the proc‐
ess to observe. There is no public record of who has purchased a credit
default swap. In the bankruptcy proceeding, all holders of claims and
interests have to file their claims and interests with the bankruptcy
court.114 While it sometimes becomes unclear exactly who owns what,
there is some information as to who holds the debtor’s financial instru‐
ments. But since credit default swaps are private transactions, there is
no way to know what the true financial incentives of anyone are. A

See Henry T. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty
Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 730 (2008) (describing
how debt holders, like equity holders, may have negative economic ownership
through derivative ownership that results in an incentive to act against the in‐
terest of other creditors).
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See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 105, at 1034–35 (describing analogous
situation in the Tower Automotive bankruptcy where it was believed that
hedge funds blocked a restructuring plan because a default would benefit their
short positions in Tower stock).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (2006); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001–05.
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hedge fund that holds a large loan position that it has acquired in the
secondary market may in fact be net short.
Credit default swaps shift the focus of negotiations outside of bank‐
ruptcy in a fundamental way. Ideally, the parties to the negotiation
want to maximize the value of the business, and then fight over the each
party’s relative share. Chapter 11 is often used as part of the process to
implement what the parties have decided is a value‐maximizing course
of action. Credit default swaps alter this dynamic. The holders of the
swaps, who may have a seat at the table by virtue of holding the under‐
lying asset, may care more about whether any course of action is a “cre‐
dit event” than whether it increases the value of the company.115
Prior to credit default swaps, the filing of a bankruptcy petition was
the midpoint in the process of resolving the company’s financial dis‐
tress. It was a step along a continuous path. Now, however, the stakes
have changed. Credit default swaps make bankruptcy discontinuous. It
is an event that fundamentally alters the payouts and identities of the
investors.
While the effects of the current economic downturn have just begun
to play out in the bankruptcy process, we already can point to examples
where credit default swaps have taken center stage. Lyondell, a transna‐
tional corporation with assets in both the United States and the Nether‐
lands, put its American operations into Chapter 11. The operations in
the Netherlands, however, remained outside of any insolvency proceed‐
ing. This situation sparked a fight (still unresolved) over whether the
American bankruptcy court would enjoin the holders of bonds issued
by the Dutch entity from seeking recovery on those bonds. Were the
bondholders to declare an event of default, the Dutch company would
be forced into Dutch bankruptcy proceedings, where the outcome
would most likely be a value‐destroying liquidation. What explains this
seemingly irrational behavior by the part of the bondholders? The fact

See Lubben, supra note 7, at 427 (indicating that creditors holding credit
default swaps may try to “jump the gun” by filing an involuntary petition to
trigger default).
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that they held a large amount of credit default swaps which would pay
handsomely upon default by the Dutch company.116
Credit default swaps create a moral hazard problem only before the
Chapter 11 begins and then in its immediate aftermath. A Chapter 11
case is a “credit event” that terminates the swap.117 The accounts are set‐
tled up and the control of the claim against the debtor soon is again
placed in the hands of the person who holds the economic interest in it.
Credit default swaps may seriously complicate (and potentially even
distort) workouts that take place before a “credit event,” but they are
likely to matter in Chapter 11 only if crucial decisions are made at the
start of the case and no one else is minding the store.
But credit default swaps still matter in bankruptcy. Much of the ac‐
tion in a large case takes place on the first day.118 Many issues—from the
approval of the DIP financing to the composition of the creditors’ com‐
mittee—are resolved in the first month. In some cases, the entire case is
effectively wrapped up within sixty days.119 A case can arise in which
the process of closing out positions takes place while the major contro‐
versies in the Chapter 11 are being resolved.120 Credit derivatives may

See Burning down the House: Why Credit‐Default Swaps Make Restructuring
Harder to Pull Off, ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 2009.
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See supra note 105 and accompanying text.

A. Mechele Dickerson, Privatizing Ethics in Corporate Reorganizations,
93 MINN. L. REV. 875, 909–10 (2009) (“First‐day orders are entered in virtually
all large reorganizations on an expedited basis in order to address time‐
sensitive matters such as obtaining DIP financing, using cash collateral, paying
certain creditor claims, and retaining key executives.”).
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See id. at 911 (documenting trend in recent years of large firms entering
bankruptcy with a prenegotiated arrangement to sell the business).
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The most conspicuous example is the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.
While major assets were sold in the first week of the case, the credit derivatives
involving Lehman were settled weeks later. Compare Simon Bowers, Lehman
fallout: Derivatives worth hundreds of billions start to unwind, GUARDIAN, October
11, 2008, at 3 (reporting on the beginning of the unwinding of $200 billion in
Lehman derivatives in mid‐October), with Ben White & Eric Dash, Barclays
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trade multiple times, but a credit derivative is only as good as the coun‐
terparty that issues it. If there are enough credit events across enough
different firms, sorting out who ultimately takes the fall when some
counterparties prove insolvent may need to be done at the same time
that various Chapter 11s are already in motion.
Moreover, credit default swaps are not the only new investment im‐
pacting the resolution of financial distress. The total return swap allows
an investor (total return receiver) to enjoy the economic rights in a loan
without the associated control rights. In a total return swap, the owner
of a loan (total return payer) exchanges the income from the loan and
any appreciation for a guaranteed income stream plus protection
against capital depreciation.121 While the owner thus off‐loads the eco‐
nomic risks associated with the loan, it retains the loan and all associ‐
ated control rights. In these cases, the contracts are not necessarily set‐
tled in the event of default.
These are cases in which the owner of record is not the person with
the economic interest and the holder of the economic interest is hidden
from the rest of the world. The potential abuses of empty voting and
hidden ownership are kept in check by the absence of any incentive on
the part of the party that holds the control rights in the claim to exercise
it in a way that runs contrary to the interests of its counterparty. Con‐
sider the dynamics when the party originating the loan is a bank. It is a
repeat player that has transferred a portfolio of loans to the counter‐
party. It is not a strategic player who has another agenda. It faces a re‐
putational penalty if it does something other than its counterparty’s
bidding. The risk here is not so much that the bank will vote contrary to

at C1 (reporting Barclays purchase of the bulk of Lehman’s assets only two
days after it filed for Chapter 11).
See Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New
Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets From Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges,
13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641, 655 n.92 (2005). The major difference between a
total return swap and a credit default swap is that the protection payer in a
credit default swap purchases only the credit risk associated with the loan,
whereas the total return receiver gets all the economic exposure of the loan.
121
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its counterparty’s interest, but rather that those with the economic inter‐
est are far away from the action.
Over time, this problem should prove self‐correcting. Those buying
the economic rights in a total return swap typically have the ability to
sell the swap. The potential purchasers are likely to be the distressed
debt professionals who will have both the expertise and the incentive to
be active in the case. They too, of course, must rely on the willingness of
the record owner to act as they wish, but in the typical case the record
owner follow their wishes. To the extent that a tension exists, parties
will try to recombine the control and formal ownership to overcome the
agency problem that exists whenever ownership and control are sepa‐
rated.122 Solving the problem, however, will likely take time, and win‐
ners and losers may appear while this is being sorted out.
Even if the big players could bargain among themselves and we no
longer need to worry about dispersed general creditors, there is still a
problem. You cannot negotiate with other stakeholders if you do not
know who they are. The record owner, the person who files the claim,
may not be the person who holds the economic stake. People who are
stakeholders may not show up and when people do claim to be stake‐
holders, you have no way either to verify their claims or know how
large a stake they hold.123

See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mana‐
gerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)
(showing that central problem of corporate finance are the agency problems
arise when ownership and control are separated).
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See Huebner & Tisdell, supra note 6, at 81–82 (“[N]ominal holders of
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right participations or swaps). As a result, the apparent creditors of the trou‐
bled firm may not be the real parties in interest or even have the decision‐
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The need to ensure negotiations upon which Chapter 11 depends
may require disclosure, at least as to who owns what.124 To be sure, dis‐
closure rules as a general matter discourage individuals from gathering
private information and dampen the incentives of parties with private
information to trade.125 But there is another principle at work here as
well. The easier it is to find the stakeholders, the more likely that a sen‐
sible plan of reorganization can emerge. The better defined the property
rights, the more valuable they are. Land becomes more valuable when
its owner and its boundaries are easy to identify from public records.126
The law narrowly limits the types of ownership interests in land for ex‐
actly this reason.127 Quite apart from whether you want to buy or sell
land, you can use your own land more effectively if it is easy for you to
learn who your neighbors are. Knowing the identity of the holders of
property rights is a key assumption of Coasean bargaining.
B. Wearing Multiple Hats
A change that is perhaps as large as anyone of those discussed lies
in the ability of individual investors to assemble together their own in‐
vestment positions with the different instruments that are available. The
proliferation of these various instruments allows particular investors to
have conflicting positions in different tranches of the debtor and to have
portfolios (perhaps with other firms in the same industry) that give
them returns from different decisions that are dramatically different
from those of other investors.

See Hu & Black, supra note 112, at 732–35 (discussing the need for dis‐
closure of hidden debt hedges by creditors in bankruptcies).
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See Baird, supra note 40.

Gary Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land: Patterns and
Economic Effects (Nov. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/workshop‐papers/lueck.pdf) (report‐
ing study indicating that land in areas that use a centralized land demarcation
system has a higher value than land in areas using the indiscriminate metes
and bounds system).
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Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
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Hedge funds play an increasing role in this aspect of the bankruptcy
process. Not only can a hedge fund buy into any part of a company’s
capital structure, but it can buy into multiple parts of the capital struc‐
ture at the same time. Occupying multiple tranches is not inevitably a
cause for concern. In theory, the hedge fund could acquire a position so
that its economic interest was coextensive with the interest of the corpo‐
ration. By holding slices throughout the capital structure, the hedge
fund could focus on maximizing enterprise value rather than only max‐
imizing the value of its investment. Yet such a benign outcome is by no
means assured. Hedge funds can take actions which increase their re‐
turns but at the expense of other investors. For example, consider a
company that files for bankruptcy. A hedge fund could, on the quiet,
buy up a large portion of the unsecured debt. At the time, the equity is
trading for trivial amounts. The hedge fund then buys up a large por‐
tion of the equity and makes this purchase public. Other investors,
thinking that the hedge fund believes that there is value in the equity,
reacts by bidding up the price of the unsecured debt. Surely, if the smart
money thinks that equity is the place to be, the unsecured debt must be
a relatively safe investment. But it may be that the purchase of the eq‐
uity was simply a loss leader and the fund plans to recover the money
spent on the equity through the increase in the prices of its bonds. In‐
deed, no one may ever know that the fund ever held the bonds. It can
both buy and sell them in anonymity.
Requiring all who hold claims against the debtor to reveal what they
own does not completely solve the problem. It does not take much im‐
agination to posit a hedge fund that has a big investment in a competi‐
tor of the debtor. The competitor may benefit from the debtor’s demise.
The hedge fund could use its rights under the Bankruptcy Code to slow
down and perhaps ultimately undermine the reorganization. But a
hedge fund’s position need not be so crudely at odds with those of the
other investors for its interests to be skewed. It might have entered into
other kinds of derivative contracts, such as hedges on commodities that
are crucial to the debtor’s business, that make it look at a plan in a way
that is different from a generic claim holder in the same class. The basic
point is that the Code’s assumption that all holders of the same type of
claim have the same economic interest no longer holds. Just as credit
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defaults and total return swaps complicate bargaining outside of bank‐
ruptcy, the ability of a hedge fund to have multiple investments compli‐
cates bargaining inside of Chapter 11.
These complications are coming to the fore at the same time that li‐
quidity, which often allowed for a sale of the company as a going con‐
cern, is drying up. The ability by a group in interest to force a sale limits
the opportunities for strategic investments in crafting a plan of reor‐
ganization. The sale settles the value of the assets, which are then div‐
vied up roughly in accord with well‐established priorities. To the extent
that the current environment makes a sale of a large company diffi‐
cult,128 it increases the likelihood that the parties to the negotiation will
not be able to assess the motivations of each other. The inability to use
the market sale as a benchmark for possible deals further complicates
the task of forming a plan of reorganization.
IV. Coalition Formation and the Problem of the Empty Core
A large firm that finds itself today in Chapter 11 can identify the re‐
levant players and their economic interests. It seems to face few of the
obstacles—high transaction costs and an abundance of private informa‐
tion—that hindered consensual agreement in earlier times. The key
players are not hapless public investors, but sophisticated parties who
have invested in this business because of the special expertise they
bring. They want to be at the bargaining table. After control rights are
properly defined and sensible disclosure rules are in place, it might
seem that the bankruptcy judge needs to do relatively little other than
provide rules that make trade reliable and transparent and a mechanism
for resolving the disputes that arise. The chance of bargaining failure
seems low. The players should reach agreement among themselves and
Even in the days of abundant liquidity, it was still the case that the sale
of very large companies was difficult to pull off. The market for $200 million
companies is more robust than is the market for $2 billion companies. For the
largest companies, hedge funds need to pool their resources together. See Brent
Shearer, Leading the M&A Pack: Private equityʹs party is in full swing . . . but for
how much longer?, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: THE DEALMAKERʹS JOURNAL, No‐
vember 1, 2006 (discussing how funds form “clubs” to do larger deals).
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the bankruptcy judge will have little more to do other than bless the
agreement and adjudicate disputes among some of the players. But mat‐
ters are not so simple.
Ironically, it is precisely here—a world in which everyone brings
special expertise to the bargaining table and negotiates in an environ‐
ment that is virtually frictionless—that a new difficulty arises. We
should not assume that people will in fact strike deals somewhere along
the Pareto frontier. When there is a zero‐sum game, there are an infinite
number of possible deals. The parties must form a coalition around one
of many possible agreements. Bargaining works best when there are fo‐
cal points.129 Someone is recognized as the person who takes the lead. It
is easier to reach a deal, when there are shared norms about who gets
what.
In the past, parties came together around established focal points.
Conventions emerged and coalitions formed along predictable lines. In
the round of Chapter 11s in the early 2000s, for example, it was settled
that out‐of‐the‐money equity received nothing and played no role at the
bargaining table. Plans that included equity, in the ordinary case, were
no longer on the table.130 Plans might include features that were in ten‐
sion with appellate court decisions (such as the pervasive use of sub‐
stantive consolidation131), but as long as everyone at the table under‐
stood that the plan would have this element, it caused few problems.
Whether a feature of a plan was embedded in blackletter law or even
known to anyone else was not essential. As long as the repeat players
who sat at the reorganization table knew it, that was enough.132
For a discussion of how focal points play an important role in the con‐
text of bargaining between two parties, see H. Peyton Young, The Economics of
Convention, 10 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 105, 116–21 (1996).
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See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 692.

See Douglas G. Baird, Substantive Consolidation Today, 47 BOSTON COL‐
LEGE L. REV. 5, 15 (2005) (“Substantive consolidation lacks the solid foundation
one usually expects of doctrines so firmly embedded in day‐to‐day practice.”).
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Many practices in modern Chapter 11 are well‐known to insiders, but
inaccessible to anyone else. For example, the fees of the indenture trustee are
always paid, even though the Bankruptcy Code allows such fees only in the
132
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With the proliferation of new players and the introduction of new
financial instruments, the old focal points may have disappeared.
Reaching agreement is likely to become much harder, even though
transaction costs are lower and information complete. Consider the fol‐
lowing hypothetical. There are four creditors, all of them at the same
priority level. Each is a distressed debt professional that holds twenty‐
five percent of the outstanding debt, all of which is unsecured. None of
them brings any special value to the business. Under these facts, there is
no efficiency loss from any one plan coming into being rather than any
other. Nevertheless, the plan does matter to the parties themselves. Sec‐
tion 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code allows any of the three to form a coali‐
tion in which they can cramdown a plan on the fourth.133 Various rules
in the Bankruptcy Code try to ensure that similar claims are treated
alike,134 but it is hard to bring this about in practice. For example, the
plan of reorganization can provide that each receives twenty‐five per‐
cent of the equity, but, as FiberMark suggests,135 the three plan propo‐
nents can effectively divide rights among themselves in a way that
leaves the fourth in the unhappy position of a powerless minority
shareholder in a closely held corporation.
event of a “substantial contribution” in a case. 11 U.S.C. §503(b)(5) (2006). Ex‐
perienced lawyers know not to expend any energy fighting them. The fees are
routinely, indeed invariably, included in the plan, without inquiry into whether
the indenture trustee’s contribution was in fact “substantial.” Junior associates
sometimes find out about this feature of modern bankruptcy practice in a haz‐
ing ritual akin to the one in which the newest apprentice in a French restaurant
is sent to retrieve soufflé weights lent to a rival. Aspiring bankruptcy lawyers
are instructed to go to plan negotiations and to be unyielding on the question of
allowing fees for the indenture trustee, only to be surprised when they are not
taken seriously.
A class accepts a plan when a majority in number and two‐thirds in
amount of the claims in a class vote in favor of it, see 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c), and
when a class accepts a plan, the judge can confirm it without going through the
“cramdown” procedure. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2006).
133

For a description of the provisions in Chapter 11 that bring this about,
see text accompanying notes 15–22 supra.
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See discussion at text accompanying notes 44–58 infra.
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Let us assume that Firm is worth $14 and that any three of the cred‐
itors can form a coalition in which they divide $12 among themselves
and leave $2 for the creditor that is left out. Here the core is empty.136
The creditor who is left out of the coalition can propose a deal that gives
two members of the coalition more and still be better off than if left out
of the deal entirely. We face a danger that the bankruptcy process de‐
generates into repeated and costly attempts at coalition building. A plan
that discriminated so transparently would not pass muster, given the
Bankruptcy Code’s requirement that plans provide the same payout
among claims in the same class, but the value can lie in control rights,
such as the ability of the directors of the business going forward and, as
we saw in FiberMark, these control rights can have dramatically differ‐
ent effects even across those in the same class.
In an earlier era, one in which the dominant issue in corporate reor‐
ganizations was the collective action problem of bringing diverse stake‐
holders together, this sort of problem did not loom large. The costs of
putting together any coalition were sufficiently high that once a coali‐
tion formed, it was unlikely that anyone else would be sufficiently or‐
ganized to break it up. Transaction costs and the frictions they caused
kept the problem at bay. Indeed, the very fact that most creditors were
passive allowed a stable coalition to form. The dramatic decline in
transaction costs and the ability of investors to interact with each other
at low cost, however, now makes the empty core a problem one worth
taking seriously. 137

For the discussion of the empty core and its application in the law, see
supra note 11.
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For a description of how low transaction costs actually create empty
core problems and how this relates to the Coase Theorem, see supra note 11.
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Barry Adler has suggested a reorganization mechanism in which junior
creditors propose a plan that could include a take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offer for the sen‐
ior creditor. See Barry E. Adler, Game‐Theoretic Bankruptcy Valuation (New York
Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07‐03, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=954147. Such a mechanism might avoid an
empty core problem, as the ability to make take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offers dramati‐
cally narrow the range of possible equilibrium agreements.
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The problem becomes worse when the competing investors bring
value to the business. Consider the following hypothetical. Firm is in
financial distress and has defaulted on its loans to both HedgeFund and
Supplier. HedgeFund is owed $10 and has a security interest in all
Firm’s assets. Supplier is owed $10, but it is unsecured. Firm could be
sold, but only $13 would be realized from the sale. (HedgeFund would
receive $10 and Supplier will receive the balance of $3). The old equity‐
holders would be wiped out. As Firm is being wound down, Manager
will be paid $2. HedgeFund, Supplier, and Manager negotiate and at‐
tempt to settle on a plan of reorganization.
HedgeFund, Supplier, and Manager all bring value to the business.
HedgeFund knows how to reshape and modify the business plan in a
way that puts Firm back on track. Supplier provides a crucial compo‐
nent and has expertise in designing the next generation of the product.
Manager knows the customer base and the best way to operate the
business. If all three agree to work together, Firm is worth $24. Any of
the two, however, could also work together and bring added value to
Firm. HedgeFund and Manager could work together and realize $22,
less $3 they must give Supplier if it is left out.138 Similarly, Supplier and
Manager will realize $20 less $10 they must give HedgeFund if it is left
out.139 Finally, HedgeFund and Supplier could reach a deal with each
other, realize $21, and exclude Manager. (Manager would still capture
$2 while the deal is being put in place, but $21 would still be left over.
All this is known to the parties, but not to the bankruptcy judge or to
outsiders.
Under these assumptions, the optimal outcome is for HedgeFund,
Supplier, and Manager to reach a deal with each other and divide the
$24 that is realized among themselves. This deal, however, is not possi‐
ble. No matter what share each is given in Firm, it will always be possi‐
Note that although Supplier is due $10, a plan can be confirmed so long
as Supplier receives what it would have received in a liquidation. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (2006).
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As a secured claimholder HedgeFund is entitled to its full claim up to
the value of the underlying collateral, in this case all of Firm’s assets. See 11
U.S.C. § 506 (2006).
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ble for one party to enter into a coalition with another that leaves them
better off than they would be if they accepted the deal with the third.
Assume, for example, that a plan is put forward in which Hedge‐
Fund, Supplier, and Manager join forces and HedgeFund receives $13,
Supplier receives $6, and Manager receives $5. They are all receiving
more than they would in the event of a liquidation of Firm, but it is not
a plan that the parties will agree on. Supplier, for example, rather than
accepting this deal can propose to HedgeFund that they dump Manager
and that HedgeFund take $14, leaving $7 for itself. HedgeFund and
Supplier are both better off than they would be if they joined forces with
Manager. Such a deal is not stable either. Manager would go to Hedge‐
Fund and suggest that it dump Supplier. Manager could offer Hedge‐
Fund a share of $16 and still leave $3 for itself. Supplier in turn could
bribe either Manager or HedgeFund to abandon this coalition, and so
forth. Under these assumptions, the core is empty. There is no agree‐
ment among the players that is a stable equilibrium.140
This hypothetical is, of course, only that. We still need to know
whether the problem of the empty core is one worth worrying about in
practice. Nevertheless, paying attention to how coalitions come into be‐
ing should inform our understanding of the Bankruptcy Code. For ex‐
ample, rules on solicitation can exacerbate the empty core problem, but
others can reduce it. A judge who worried about the empty core will, for
example, be more vigilant in enforcing the rules of the classification of
claims and ensuring that claims in the same class are treated similarly
and in particular how even nominally identical control rights may give
disproportionate power to the majority coalition. A judge who pre‐
vented side deals on governance rights might make it more likely that
parties would reach a deal.
Another example of a rule that might prevent the core from being
empty is the one that gives the existing managers of the firm the exclu‐
sive right to propose a plan of reorganization at the outset of the case.

For a discussion and formal proof of the conditions necessary under
these assumptions, see Aivazian & Callen, The Coase Theorem and the Empty
Core, supra note 11, at 179‐80.
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This rule effectively removes one possible coalition from the table in our
second hypothetical (namely, the coalition between HedgeFund and
Supplier that eliminates Manager). Eliminating some coalitions may in‐
crease the chance that the core is not empty. This is the case with our
example. There is an equilibrium plan in which Manager is given $10,
HedgeFund $10, and Supplier $4. Neither HedgeFund nor Supplier can
do a deal with Manager in which Manager receives more than $10 and
either is left with more than it receives in the proposed plan.141 Hedge‐
Fund and Supplier could, of course, do much better if they were able to
propose a plan that excluded Manager, but the exclusivity rule prevents
this from happening and thereby creates an equilibrium solution. The
rule of Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd142 might also prohibit the deal be‐
tween HedgeFund and Manager, if Manager were also the owner of the
business.143
The problem of the empty core cannot, of course, provide a complete
justification for either rule. These rules serve other functions and may
compromise other goals of bankruptcy policy.144 Moreover, it is a ration‐
ale that depends crucially on each of the players bringing something to
the table. When they do not, rules such as the one in Boyd, may have the
If HedgeFund and Manager worked together and left Supplier out,
Hedgefund and Manager would have only $19 to split between themselves. If
Supplier and Manager worked together, they would be left with only $10 to
split.
141

228 U.S. 482 (1913). Boyd established the absolute priority rule, in which
a junior class could receive nothing until senior classes were paid in full, even if
the senior class consented. This rule has been watered down by the current
Bankruptcy Code enacted in 1978, which allows an out‐of‐the‐money junior
class to receive under the plan if the senior classes accepts it. See 11 U.S.C. §
1129 (2006). In fact, deviations from absolute priority are commonplace. See
Baird & Bernstein, supra note 24, at 1932 n.2.
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In this case, Manager would be left with $2 after Supplier and Hedge‐
Fund collect on their claims, because Manager, as an equityholder, is a residual
claimant that collects only after the creditors are paid in full.
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One of us discussed these issues in Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jack‐
son, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 738 (1988).
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effect of making bargaining harder rather than easier because it in‐
creases the number of people who have to be part of any bargain. Nev‐
ertheless, looking at the Bankruptcy Code and asking whether it pro‐
motes or impedes coalition‐building is an inquiry that has been too long
neglected.
Some sections of the Bankruptcy Code exacerbate the bargaining
problem. Most conspicuous are the rules governing solicitation of accep‐
tances of plans. Section 1125 can be read to forbid agreements between
creditors before the plan proponent writes a disclosure statement and
has the judge approve it.145 One‐on‐one discussions with another stake‐
holder rarely pose a problem, even if the communication is a draft plan.
Negotiations per se are similarly unproblematic. Nor is section 1125 vio‐
lated by obtaining informal assurances from a creditor to support a par‐
ticular plan.146 But in the new world of Chapter 11, such informal assur‐
ances are sometimes not enough. The holder of a particular claim may
be a bank today and a vulture investor tomorrow. Ensuring that you can
rely next month on the support you garner this week by obtaining a
writing that binds the party is useful. Such binding agreements, how‐
ever, may not be enforceable. Indeed, if made they expose those who
made them to the risk that their votes will not count.147 Such doubt is
itself an impediment to coalition building.

The relevant statutory text is set out in 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2006). For a
discussion of relevant bankruptcy practice, see Daniel J. DeFranceschi, Delaware
Bankruptcy Court Announces Bright‐Line Rule for Use of Lock‐Up Agreements in
Chapter 11 Cases, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16 (2003).
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For a narrow reading of section 1125(b), see Century Glove, Inc. v. First
American Bank of New York, 860 F.2d 94, 100‐03 (3rd Cir. 1988) (interpreting
“solicitation” narrowly so as not to inhibit negotiations). See also In re Snyder,
51 B.R. 432, 437 (Bankr. Utah 1985) (“The terms ‘solicit’ and ‘solicitation’ . . .
must be interpreted very narrowly to refer only to a specific request for an offi‐
cial vote either accepting or rejecting a plan of reorganization. The terms do not
encompass discussions, exchanges of information, negotiations, or tentative
arrangements . . . .”).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2006).
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In practice, bankruptcy judges have allowed parties to form coali‐
tions without going through the hoops of section 1125.148 Nevertheless,
it is not certain that this will always be the case. A court interpreting sec‐
tion 1125 might conclude that a disclosure statement must be approved
before someone can be asked to make a binding commitment to vote in
favor of a plan. Such an interpretation of section 1125 may run counter
to some practices that have emerged in recent years and be inconsistent
with sensible bankruptcy policy, but some courts, especially appellate
courts, have little sympathy for interpretations that are out of step with
what seems the plain language of the statute.149
Bankruptcy bargaining in the current environment may be one in
which the core is empty. Different players are bringing something to the
party, and the value of control allows those with control to stiff those
without it. There are some steps that are necessary in order for the proc‐
ess to work, such as putting a stop to various bankruptcy rules that con‐
tribute to the fragmentation problem. These include the expansion of
priorities, such as requiring assurance of payment to utilities150 and
payment in full to vendors who ship within 20 days before the filing of
the petition.151 The proliferation of exclusions to the automatic stay has
made matters worse as well. We can also take steps to improve the
bankruptcy exchange. One can clarify exactly what rules govern trading
and particularly what disclosure rules make sense. We can also figure
out some way to identify stakeholders. Independent of optimal disclo‐
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See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 265–68 (4th ed. 2006).

See, e.g., Perlman v. Catapult Entertainment, Inc., 165 F.3d 747, 754 (9th
Cir. 1999) (“Policy arguments cannot displace the plain language of the statute;
that the plain language . . . may be bad policy does not justify a judicial re‐
write.”); In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 971 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Answers to con‐
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doctrines may survive as glosses on ambiguous language enacted in 1978 or
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See 11 U.S.C. § 366 (2006).

See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (2006) (classifying such payment as an adminis‐
trative expense).
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sure, you need to know who owns what in order to defragment capital
structures.
But bolder steps may be needed to create focal points or otherwise
ensure that the core is not empty. Consider, for example, the way in
which the bargaining dynamic would be altered dramatically if the
Bankruptcy Code were changed and gave the bankruptcy judge the
power to order the sale of the business upon the motion of any party in
interest. The costs of such a rule, of course, have been well explored.152
In an illiquid market, if the sale takes place, the price may be less than
its value in its best use and hence stakeholder recoveries go down.153 But
once the sale is ordered, the bargaining environment is altered. Order‐
ing the sale of the firm to the highest bidder is a way of putting a gun to
the parties’ heads. Milton Pollock did essentially this in the bankruptcy
of Drexel Burnham. He told the parties that if they could not reach
agreement in short order, he would sell the firm’s assets and retired to
his chambers for a few minutes. Parties found the judge’s threat credible
and feared that a sale would make them all worse off (believing that the
particular junk bonds were worth far more than the market would pay
for them). Notwithstanding weeks of deadlock, they reached an agree‐
ment that was scribbled on a yellow legal pad just before time ex‐
pired.154
The use of this “nuclear” option may be a way to induce agreement,
and the threat may only rarely need to be carried out. Moreover, little
going‐concern value may have been at risk in many cases. The social
See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Firesales, 106
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2007) (empirical evidence suggesting sales in bankruptcy yield
lower values than when firms reorganize).
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See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Ca‐
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dation sales yield lower prices than actual value in best use as similarly situ‐
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Nancy Miller, Judge Rules With Rod, Impish Smile, USA TODAY,
March 25, 1992, at 5B (discussing how Judge Pollock threatened disman‐
tle brokerage firm on his own if the parties did not reach a deal before
he returned from taking a phone call in his chambers).
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cost of carrying out the threat may be small. Again, the assets involved
in Drexel were securities. Even if the market undervalued them, there is
no social loss associated with selling them quickly. But we need to con‐
sider the cases in which there are a variety of different plans and only
one of them preserves going‐concern value. In such cases, relying on the
parties to reach agreement has its greatest value. When the parties
themselves know the highest and best use of the assets, but others do
not, inducing such an agreement may be the best way to maximize the
value of the assets.
V. Conclusion
Judges are quite likely to follow the lead of professional investors
when they present a united front. Modern judges are likely to enforce
intercreditor agreements as written, but in a world in which the finan‐
cial instruments are new, the agreements are likely incomplete and
some recourse to gap‐filling is necessary. Even if things will sort them‐
selves out eventually, life is not going to be easy during the interim.
Perhaps the most important thing that courts can do in fashioning rules
is ensuring that whatever is put in place gives clear benchmarks that
future investors can use to navigate their way. The current disequilib‐
rium is the result of instruments that have already been written. In‐
vestment going forward will use different and improved ones. What
may matter most is the ability of different investors to write new ones,
learning from past mistakes and being able to predict how judges will
respond to new provisions.
The larger lesson is a more general one. The lifeblood of corporate
reorganizations is and always has been negotiation. Creating the opti‐
mal environment for facilitating such negotiations is the principal busi‐
ness of those who shape the law. The most direct lesson of all this for
the bankruptcy judge is likely one that the best have intuited long ago:
She should not interpret the Bankruptcy Code in a way that creates an
empty core. A simple and transparent bargaining environment in some
cases may not be enough. Precisely because it is simple and transparent,
there is an increased danger that parties will find it hard for stable coali‐
tions to emerge. It also suggests that much of recent bankruptcy re‐
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form—changes that have added complexity to the Code and sought to
corral the bankruptcy judge’s discretion—are headed in the wrong di‐
rection. The problem of ensuring coalition formation requires giving
bankruptcy judges more discretion, not less.
If past is prologue, the uncertainties that financial innovation
brings with it are likely to be resolved satisfactorily, even if not immedi‐
ately. We do not believe that this anti‐commons problem—and the asso‐
ciated empty core problem that may come with it—will be an enduring
feature of corporate finance, only that the emerging round of Chapter 11
will revolve around these problems precisely because they are new. Our
experience with large corporations competing in a market economy is
only about a century and a half old. Capitalism is still very much a work
in progress and the science of corporate finance at an early stage.

